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We argue that the size and composition of corporate boards are determined by tradeoffs involving 
the information that directors bring to boards versus the coordination costs and free rider problems 
associated with their additions to boards. Our hypotheses lead to predictions that firm size and 
growth opportunities are important determinants of these board characteristics. Using a sample of 
82 U.S. firms that survived over the period of 1935 through 2000, we find strong support for the 
hypotheses. The hypotheses also find support in the relation between changes in board size and 
firms’ merger and divestiture activity, and changes in the geographical diversification of firms. 
We find no robust relation between firm performance and either board size or composition after 
accounting for the determinants of these board characteristics.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the scholarly literature and public discourse on corporate governance in recent 
years has focused on the size and composition of corporate boards of directors.  Many scholars, 
regulators, and investors argue that corporate boards should be small and comprised largely of 
independent directors. Scholarly research is often cited to support this position, including papers 
documenting an inverse relation between board size and firm value, and others documenting a 
relation between proxies for the independence of boards and firm performance. 
In both the scholarly literature on boards of directors and the public debate over corporate 
governance, explicit recognition that the size and composition of boards emerge endogenously has 
gathered momentum only recently.
1  If there are tradeoffs associated with different board sizes 
and compositions (we presume there are) and if capital and product markets provide incentives for 
firms to maximize value (we presume they do), then we expect firms to choose board sizes and 
compositions that are suitable for their circumstances, at least on average.   This perspective leads 
us to the following question – is the observable variation in the size and composition of boards 
consistent with value-maximizing processes?  
Adopting the view that boards are endogenously chosen, this paper examines the size and 
composition of boards for a unique sample of firms – 82 publicly traded U.S. firms that survived 
over the period of 1935 through 2000.  We deliberately choose these firms because they have 
survived for so long, suggesting to us that their governance structures are likely to be appropriate 
for their purposes.
2  We document how the boards of these companies evolved during 1935-2000 
and test hypotheses about the factors affecting their size and composition. Our analysis reveals the 
following main results:   
                                                 
1 Some early exceptions are Williamson (1975), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). 
2 The trade-offs faced in forming our sample are discussed in greater detail in Section 3.   3
 
o Board size is directly related to firm size and inversely related to proxies for growth 
opportunities.    
   
o Insider representation on boards is inversely related to firm size and directly related to 
proxies for growth opportunities.  
 
o Some persistence exists in both board size and composition, beyond what the variables 
in our model predict, suggesting the possibility of path dependence in board structure.    
 
o Changes in board size over time are directly related to merger and acquisition activity 
undertaken by the firm and these changes tend to reverse, although not completely, in the 
years subsequent to the merger. 
 
o Board size and changes in board size are positively associated with past changes in the 
degree of geographical diversification of the firm’s business. However, insider 
representation does not seem to be visibly affected by these changes. 
 
o Industry shocks, measured as the fraction of firms with the same SIC codes (as the 
sample firms) that get delisted due to merger and acquisition activity, lead to decreases in 
board size.  
  
o No robust relation exists between firm performance and either board size or insider 
representation after accounting for the endogeneity of board structure to firm 
characteristics.   
 
The results support the proposition that board size and composition are determined 
endogenously in ways consistent with value maximization.   The results suggest caution in 
interpreting empirical evidence that purports to draw causal links between board variables and 
firm performance when board variables are treated as exogenous (for example, Yermack (1996)). 
They also suggest that a “one size fits all” approach to board size and composition is misguided 
(similar to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2007), since a large part of the considerable variation in 
board size and composition is explained by variables such as firm size and growth opportunities, 
suggesting an underlying economic logic at work in determining board structure.  
Our results contribute to the recently growing literature that theoretically models (Harris and 
Raviv 2008, Raheja 2005 and Adams and Fereira 2006) and empirically examines (Boone, Field,   4
Karpoff, and Raheja 2007, Coles, et al 2007 and Linck, Netter, and Yang 2007) determinants of 
board size, composition and control and their relation with firm performance. The approach in this 
paper is complementary to that of the recent empirical papers in that we work with the same 
research question using a significantly longer time period and a significantly smaller sample. The 
similarity of our results to regularities already documented in the literature, despite the significant 
differences in approach, occasion a reiteration of the call by Harris and Raviv (2008) that 
“…empirical work on corporate board size and composition (should) take the endogeneity issue 
seriously”. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses and reviews 
relevant literature. In Section 3 we describe the data set and present descriptive statistics for the 
key variables.  Section 4 presents regression results of the determinants of board size and 
composition. Section 5 re-examines the relation between board structure and its determinants by 
relating changes in these determinants to changes in board structure that occur around firms’ 
merger and acquisition transactions. Section 6 examines the relation between board characteristics 
and firm performance.  Section 7 discusses the results and provides concluding comments. 
2. HYPOTHESES  AND  REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Boards of directors serve two general functions.  First, they advise managers about a firm’s 
business strategy (Williamson (1975), Fama and Jensen (1983)), which we refer to as the advisory 
function of boards. Second, they monitor the performance of managers (Fama (1980), Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998), Monks and Minow (2000)), which we refer to as the monitoring function of 
boards.   We take the perspective that the costs and benefits of the two functions are likely to vary 
across firms in ways that result in systematic relations between the attributes of firms and the size 
and composition of their boards.        5
A. Board  size 
Several scholars have asserted that small boards operate more effectively than large boards 
because of the high coordination costs and free rider problems associated with large boards.  For 
example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992, 65) argue that “[w]hen a board has more than ten members it 
becomes more difficult for them all to express their ideas and opinions.”  Similarly, Jensen (1993, 
865) conjectures that “keeping boards small can help improve their performance.  When boards 
get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively […]”.  
In a recent theoretical paper, Harris and Raviv (2008) trade off the benefits of greater 
expertise with more outside directors against the costs of an aggravated free-rider problem to 
arrive at an optimal number of outside directors on the board. Their model provides an alternative, 
non-causal explanation for an observed correlation (negative or otherwise) between firm profits 
and board size. Raheja (2005) develops a model which trades off the higher agency costs of 
greater insider representation on boards against the higher co-ordination/information costs of 
greater outsider representation. Raheja’s (2005) model predicts that smaller boards are not more 
useful unconditionally – for example, they are likely to be more useful in highly competitive 
industries.  
In empirical studies Baker and Gompers (2001) report that board size is increasing in asset 
tangibility for a sample of U.S. firms conducting initial public offerings (“IPOs”) and Mak and 
Roush (2000) find an inverse relation between board size and growth opportunities for a sample 
of New Zealand IPOs.  More recently, Coles et al (2007); Linck et al (2007); and Boone et al 
(2007) model board size and composition as functions of asset characteristics and firm 
governance characteristics. The combined findings of these papers support the model-based 
predictions.   6
Linck et al (2007) find that board size decreases in a firm’s growth opportunities and stock 
return volatility and increases with firm size. Boone et al (2007) track firms for ten years after the 
IPO and find that board size increases with firm size and diversity. Coles et al (2007) report 
similar findings regarding the determinants of board size. They then specifically examine the 
relationship between the market-to-book ratio of firms and board size. Their results lead them to 
the conclusion that “certain classes of firms are actually likely to benefit from larger boards […]”. 
We take the perspective that there are tradeoffs associated with different board sizes, 
tradeoffs that are likely to vary across firms and industries.  The major advantage of large boards 
is the greater collective information that the board possesses about factors that affect the value of 
firms, such as product markets, technology, regulation, mergers and acquisitions etc.  This 
information is valuable for both the advisory (Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993)) and monitoring 
functions of boards.   
The major disadvantages of large boards are the coordination costs and free rider problems 
referred to above.  We presume that coordination costs increase in board size.  Economic analyses 
of constitutional democracies typically cite the costs of making collective decisions with the entire 
population as the raison d’etre  of representative government.  Buchanan and Tullock (1974) 
generalize this to all cases of collective decision-making, stating that “the expected costs of 
organizing decisions, under any given rule, will be less in the smaller unit than in the larger.” The 
free rider problems associated with large boards stem from the observation that the average 
influence of a board member varies inversely with board size.  With less influence, board 
members have reduced incentives to bear the private costs of investing in information and actively 
monitoring the firm’s managers.  Just as the free rider problem among stockholders increases with   7
the diffusion of stock ownership, the free rider problem among board members increases as the 
board becomes larger.       
   We take the perspective that the choice of board size is governed by the tradeoff between the 
aggregate information that large boards possess and the increased costs of decision-making 
associated with large boards. We examine two attributes of firms that are likely to affect this 
tradeoff, and hence, the optimal size of boards: firm size and growth opportunities.       
     Firm size.  We expect a direct relation between the size of firms and the size of their boards.   
Large firms are, by definition, engaged in a higher volume of activities than small firms.  In 
addition, large firms are likely to be engaged in a greater diversity of activities than small firms, 
such as operating in different product and geographic markets, engaging in more merger and 
acquisition activity, using more sophisticated financial and marketing techniques, and so forth.   
Because of the higher volume and greater diversity of activities, large firms have more demand 
for information than do small firms, including information about product markets, foreign 
markets, mergers and acquisitions, technology, and labor relations.   
As an illustrative example, consider the cases of Wal-Mart and Cost-U-Less, two companies 
that operate retail discount department stores.  Wal-Mart, with a market capitalization of $197 
billion and 1.9 million employees, has 15 members on its board.
3   Cost-U-Less, with a 
corresponding market capitalization of only $44 million and 600 employees, has only 6 members 
on its board.
4  In addition to being substantially larger than Cost-U-Less, Wal-Mart is engaged in 
more diverse activities.  Whereas Cost-U-Less is quite focused, operating 11 warehouse clubs 
only in island markets, Wal-Mart is quite diverse, operating thousands of stores of various formats 
in the U.S. and many foreign markets.  In addition to its retail operations, Wal-Mart owns a food 
                                                 
3 As in July 2007 
4 As in July 2007   8
distribution subsidiary.  We presume that the greater size and diversity of Wal-Mart’s activities 
accounts for most of the difference in the size of the two companies’ boards and therefore we 
predict a direct relation between the size of firms and the size of their boards.  In our empirical 
tests, we check for nonlinearity in this direct relation. To enrich the measurement of firm size, in 
addition to its market capitalization, we measure firm size by the geographical spread of the firm’s 
operations and the number of unrelated business segments within the firm.  
   Growth opportunities.  We expect an inverse relation between growth opportunities and 
board size for two reasons.  First, it is widely accepted that the costs of monitoring managers 
increase with a firm’s growth opportunities (Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993)).  
As a result, the free rider problem associated with large boards is more severe in firms with high 
growth opportunities.  In order for board members to have sufficient private incentives to bear the 
high monitoring costs in high growth firms, boards must be small.       
Second, firms with higher growth opportunities generally require nimbler governance 
structures.  Since these firms are usually younger and operate in more volatile business 
environments than low growth firms, they require governance structures that facilitate rapid 
decision-making and redeployment of assets.  By more volatile business environments, we refer to 
markets characterized by frequent technological change, unstable market shares, rapidly changing 
relative prices, and so forth.  As the costs of altering corporate strategy in response to these factors 
is likely to be inversely related to board size, we expect that the more volatile the environment in 
which a firm operates, the smaller will be its board.
5  This argument is consistent with the 
                                                 
5 Kole and Lehn (1999) find that board sizes of airlines declined after the industry was deregulated in 1978, which is    
consistent with our hypothesis since deregulation creates less stable business environments, thereby enhancing the value 
of both nimbleness and the monitoring function of boards.  Frye & Smith (2003) similarly find that regulated firms, 
which have less need for nimble boards, increase their boards more than unregulated firms following initial public 
offerings.   9
empirical findings of Cheng (2007) that larger board size is associated with less variable firm 
performance. 
  To illustrate how growth opportunities could be related to board size we consider the 
example of two companies with different growth opportunities, Honeywell, a diversified 
manufacturing firm, and Genentech, a biotechnology company.  Honeywell generally would be 
viewed as a lower growth company than Genentech.  This is borne out by various proxies for 
growth opportunities.  For example, the ratio of the market value of Honeywell’s equity to the 
book value of its equity is 5.2, compared with a corresponding ratio of 7.3 for Genentech.     
Honeywell has a market capitalization of $47 billion, versus $80 billion for Genentech, making 
Honeywell considerably smaller than Genentech, at least in terms of market capitalization.
6  All 
else equal, this would tend to cause its board to be smaller than Genentech’s.  
Notwithstanding the size difference in the two companies, Honeywell’s board is much larger 
than Genentech’s.  Honeywell has 12 directors, including only one inside director. Despite its size 
advantage, Genentech’s board with only 7 members is considerably smaller than Honeywell’s, 
which, we hypothesize, gives it a nimbler governance structure and stronger incentives to monitor.  
Both of these features of small boards are expected to be valued more highly at Genentech, which 
has higher growth opportunities and, presumably, more information asymmetries. This is also 
consistent with the homogeneity and technical expertise of Genentech’s board members (four of 
them hold PhD’s, another an M.D., and one has a Doctor of Law degree). 
B. Board  composition 
The early literature on corporate boards mainly focused on board composition i.e. board 
independence. Although results from early empirical tests were mixed, Lipton & Lorsch (1992) 
suggested that there be a ratio of at least two independent directors for every potentially affiliated   10
director. Jensen (1993) argues that since inside directors will be virtually ineffective in critically 
evaluating the CEO they should not find place on the board and the only inside director on the 
board should be the CEO.   
Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) develop a bargaining model in which the board’s 
independence as a monitor evolves as a function of the bargaining power of the CEO (increased 
by successful past performance) and the incumbent board. Raheja (2005), whose model takes into 
account both the monitoring and advising roles of the board, finds that outsider dominated boards 
may be more optimal in firms with lower information costs. However, value considerations in 
firms where insider information is critical could optimally yield insider dominated boards. In a 
similar vein, Harris and Raviv (2008) use a model of board control (rather than fraction of 
insiders/outsiders) to show that when insiders have important information relative to outsiders, 
insider-controlled boards are preferred and in fact outsider-controlled boards may be value-
destructive. Interestingly, Adams and Ferreira (2007) model a potential conflict between the dual 
roles of the board i.e. monitoring and advising, to show that management friendly boards can be 
optimal.  
Consistent with the models discussed above, in empirical work Bathala and Rao (1995) 
document an inverse relationship between growth opportunities and the proportion of boards 
consisting of outsiders.  Linck et al (2007) find that board independence decreases in a firm’s 
growth opportunities and stock return volatility and increases with firm size. Similarly, Boone et 
al (2007) and Coles et al (2007) find that board independence increases with firm size and 
diversity. Further, Coles et al (2007) conclude that “certain classes of firms are actually likely to 
benefit from […] boards with more insider representation”. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 As in July, 2007.   11
We have two hypotheses regarding the determinants of board composition based on the 
same two firm characteristics, size and growth opportunities, that we suggest as determinants of 
board size.  
Firm size. The potential for agency conflicts between managers and shareholders is expected 
to increase in firm size (Barclay and Smith (1995a, b)).  The principal reason for this is that the 
percent of equity held by top managers is expected to vary inversely with firm size.  In addition, 
larger firms may have greater agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and less 
transparency with respect to the performance of its individual units (Scharfstein (2000), 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000)).  We expect a direct relation between the independence of boards 
and firm size as a means to mitigate the agency problems associated with firm size.    
Growth opportunities. The information asymmetries associated with high growth firms, as 
discussed before, are expected to affect board composition.  First, information asymmetries impair 
the ability of outside directors to fulfill their advisory function in high growth firms.  Either the 
outside directors make decisions based on less information than their counterparts in low growth 
firms, or they incur high costs of obtaining information to allow them to make more informed 
decisions. Perhaps the major way of obtaining the information is through discussions with the 
firm’s CEO.  However, the opportunity cost of the CEO’s time is especially high for high growth 
firms, making this a highly inefficient means of mitigating information asymmetries.   
Furthermore, since the director also serves a monitoring function, the CEO may have incentives to 
obscure certain types of information.  For this reason, we expect an inverse relation between 
growth opportunities and the proportion of boards consisting of independent directors.     
Relatedly, high growth firms require more nimble governance structures than their low 
growth counterparts, for reasons discussed above.  One of the major costs of an outsider   12
dominated board in firms with substantial information asymmetries is that the board’s decision-
making is likely to be deliberate, not nimble.  Since the optimal exercise of flexibility options 
often requires speedy decisions, insider domination of boards may be desirable for high growth 
firms.  
The costs associated with the monitoring function of boards also differ for high growth 
versus low growth firms.  Myers (1977) argues that agency costs can be fairly high for high 
growth firms as managers have greater flexibility with regard to future investments and a greater 
potential for wealth transfers from potential investors to inside owners (Gaver and Gaver (1993)).  
To mitigate the potential agency problems associated with high growth firms one might expect to 
find greater representation of outside directors on boards of high growth firms.  On the other hand, 
the information asymmetries that raise the costs of external monitoring of managers are likely to 
result in higher insider ownership of equity (Holmstrom (1979), Smith and Watts (1992)).  If so, 
higher insider ownership of equity is likely to result in less demand for outside directors on the 
board.  If insider ownership of equity is a more effective remedy for the agency costs associated 
with information asymmetries in high growth firms, then high growth firms are likely to have 
more insider representation on boards.  This is ultimately an empirical issue. 
To summarize, we expect board size and insider representation on boards to evolve in ways 
consistent with value maximization.  This leads us to the predictions that (i) board size is directly 
related to firm size and inversely related to growth opportunities and (ii) insider representation on 
boards is inversely related to firm size and directly related to growth opportunities.   
We test our predictions in two settings. First, in Section 4 we use panel models to relate firm 
characteristics to board size and insider representation. Then, in Section 5 we relate the changes in 
board size and insider representation to M&A activity undertaken by the sample firms.    13
3.  SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A.  Sample and data 
To test the hypotheses discussed in the previous section, we compile time series data for a 
sample of manufacturing firms that survived from 1935 through 2000. The sample consists of all 
firms in the Center for Research on Security Prices (“CRSP”) database which survive from 1935 
through 2000 and for which data is available in the Moody’s Industrial Manual. We deliberately 
impose a high survivorship requirement since firms that survive over long periods of time are 
presumed to have governance structures that are appropriate for their circumstances. Also, the 
longer time period facilitates examination of firms’ boards over intervals that are sufficiently long 
to allow these firms to make visible adjustments in their board structure (we use five-year 
intervals to measure board structure).   
However, the sample selection criterion also imposes multiple constraints on our empirical 
tests. First, the reduction in sample size that results due to the survivorship requirement 
considerably reduces cross-sectional variation in asset and governance characteristics. Second, the 
sample extends to a period in which accounting data (pre-1950) and governance data (pre-1980) 
are meager and not easily available. Although we somewhat overcome the second constraint by 
hand collecting the data, the database thus created is by no means as rich as the usual datasets 
employed in empirical studies of governance (the specific details of our data set including certain 
standard data items that are not available to us are discussed below), We believe that the net effect 
of our sample selection criteria forces us to proceed in a setting of empirical parsimony in which 
we significantly bias ourselves against systematic findings.   14
There are 134 firms in the CRSP database that survive from the period 1935 through 2000.
7 
We search the Moody’s Industrial Manual for these firms. If a firm is not in the Manual for at 
least half the sample period i.e. 7 out of 14 sample years we exclude the firm from the sample. 
This reduces our sample size to 82 firms (list in alphabetical order is in Appendix A).  Not 
surprisingly, the sample includes many prominent large U.S. corporations, such as General 
Electric, Procter & Gamble, and Coca-Cola, as well as smaller companies such as Tootsie Roll 
Industries, Foster Wheeler, and L.S. Starrett.  The companies span a wide range of manufacturing 
industries, including coal mining, oil and gas extraction, food and kindred products, tobacco 
products, chemical and allied products, petroleum refining, electronic and other electrical 
equipment and components etc. 
Accounting and board information is collected from various editions of Moody’s Manuals.
8 
Although COMPUSTAT data is available from the early 1950s, we use Moody’s as the source of 
accounting data throughout the sample period to maintain consistency in the reporting of these 
data. We collect data at 5-year intervals beginning with year 1935 (then 1940, 1945 and so on). 
We collect the following board data items from the Moody’s Manuals for each firm in each 
sample year: (i) the number of directors, (ii) the number of inside directors (that is, directors who 
are or were officers of the firm). The Moody’s Manuals do not provide adequate information to 
consistently classify directors as “gray” (or not), as is customary in the literature on boards.
9  
However there is sufficient information to consistently identify insider directors. As a result, in 
                                                 
7 Of all the firms that were listed in the CRSP database as of December, 1935, about 59% were eventually delisted due 
to a merger, 35% were delisted due bankruptcy related reasons and the remaining 6% were delisted for other reasons. 
8 Prior to 1955, Moody’s Manual was titled “Moody’s Manual of Investments and Security Rating Service”. Post 1955, 
there are several editions of Moody’s Manual including Moody’s Bank and Finance manual, Moody’s Industrial 
Manual, Moody’s Municipal & Government Manual, Moody’s Public Utility Manual, and Moody’s Transportation 
Manual. Our data is primarily collected from Moody’s Industrial Manual. 
9As defined in Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), inside directors are employees and former employees of the firm; 
outside directors are not employees of the firms and usually do not have any business ties to the firm aside from their   15
this paper we measure board composition as the percentage of the board consisting of inside 
directors. 
The recent literature on boards, both theoretical (Hermalin & Weisbach 1998, Raheja 2005) 
and empirical (Boone et al, 2007 Linck et al 2007, Coles et al 2007) has focused on the interaction 
of ownership structure (CEO and director ownership) and board structure. In our sample this is an 
interaction that remains unexplored due to the severe constraints on the availability of ownership 
structure data for our sample period.
10 To account for the effects of this unavailable data and other 
un-modeled firm specific effects we mainly rely on firm-fixed effects models to test our 
hypotheses.  
We also collect the following accounting, M&A, business segments, and geographical 
diversification data items from the Moody’s manual for each sample year: (i) total sales, (ii) total 
assets, (iii) property, plant and equipment, (iv) book value of equity, (v) book value of long term 
debt, (vi) book value of preferred stock, (vii) operating profits (viii) number of acquisitions and 
divestitures in the preceding five-year period (ix) the number of unrelated businesses that the firm 
is engaged in and (x) the geographical diversification of the firm’s domestic operations. 
Geographical diversification of the firm’s operation is measured as the number of states in which 
the firm has manufacturing or storage facilities or both. For retailing firms in the sample such as 
Foot Locker, Philips Van Heusen etc we use the number of states with store locations. Due to 
significant cross-sectional differences in how geographical information is reported by Moody’s 
we limit its use to fixed-effect panel models where within-firm changes are used to explain 
variation in board characteristics. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
directorship; “gray” directors are those directors who are attorneys or business persons having long standing 
relationships with the firm.   16
A number of variables frequently used in the literature are not reported consistently in the 
Moody’s manual and thus do not enter our regression specifications. These include proxies for the 
extent of growth opportunities (R&D and advertising expenditures) and the dollar values of the 
acquisitions (divestitures) undertaken. 
We use monthly stock prices from CRSP to calculate market values of equity. In the spirit of 
Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) we measure industry shocks as the fraction of firms that are delisted 
from the CRSP database due to mergers, measured annually at the 2-digit SIC code level and then 
summed over the preceding five-year period. Data on inflation which is used to deflate dollar-
denominated variables is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor) 
website. Complete data for all 14 years exists for 76 firms of the 82 firms. 
B. Descriptive  statistics 
Table I reports descriptive statistics for the key variables by year. 
Panel A displays the mean and median of sales, book value of assets and market value of 
equity. All values are reported in constant 2000 dollars. Mean and median equity value grow 
substantially over time, from $2.2 billion and $476 million, respectively, in 1935 to $32.1 billion 
and $6.9 billion, respectively, in 2000.  Similar patterns exist for sales and book asset value.  
Panel A also reports descriptive statistics of three measures of growth opportunities: (i) 
market-to-book value of assets, (ii) market-to-book value of equity and (iii) the ratio of property, 
plant and equipment (PPE) to the book value of total assets. The variables show an increase in 
growth opportunities from 1935-1965, a decline in growth opportunities from 1965-1980, and an 
increase in growth opportunities from 1980-2000. For example, the median market-to-book value 
of assets increases, in a non-monotonic way, from 1.3 in 1935 to 1.7 in 1965, declines to 1.1 in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
10  Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) is the only paper that we are aware of that examines the ownership 
structure of U.S. firms in a period comparable to ours. They use a dataset of officer and director ownership of over 1500   17
1980, and increases to 1.5 in 2000.  There is a similar and more pronounced pattern in the market-
to-book value of equity. The ratio of property plant and equipment to total assets, which is 
inversely related to growth opportunities, declines from 0.389 in 1935 to 0.315 in 1965, increases 
to 0.366 in 1980, and falls to 0.282 in 2000. Hence, all three measures reflect considerable 
variation in growth opportunities over time.  
Panel B of Table I provides descriptive statistics for the board variables.  Median board size 
increases from 11 in 1935 to a peak of 15 in 1960, and declines rather steadily thereafter to a low 
of 11 in the most recent year, 2000.  Mean board size reveals a similar pattern, peaking at 14.48 in 
1960 and taking its minimum value of 11.16 in 2000.  Mean board size is substantially lower in 
2000 than it is at the beginning of the sample period in 1935, when it takes the value of 12.43.
11   
The firms in our sample (mean asset size in 1995 of approximately $19 billion) are on 
average larger than those in Linck et al (2007) (mean asset size of $1.6 billion). In line with this 
difference in firm size the average board size of our sample is also much higher (11.68 compared 
to 7.5). A similar comparison holds between our sample and that of Coles et al (2007) – our 
sample mean sales of $16 billion in 1995 compared to their average of $4.1 billion and mean 
board sizes of 11.64 and 10.4 respectively. 
An interesting pattern exists in the standard deviation of board size – it declines substantially 
and rather steadily from 5.545 in 1935 to 2.682 in 2000.  Similarly, the coefficient of variation in 
board size also decreases almost monotonically, from 0.45 in 1935 to 0.24 in 2000.  These data 
strongly suggest a convergence towards smaller boards over time. This might have occurred 
because the firms in the sample became more similar over time, although the cross-sectional 
                                                                                                                                                                  
U.S. corporations in the 1930s maintained by the SEC.  
11 Tests show that mean (median) board size in 1935 is significantly (at the 0.01 level) smaller than mean (median) 
board size in 1960 and mean (median) board size in 1960 is significantly (at the 0.01 level) larger than mean (median) 
board size in 2000.   18
standard deviations in firm size and growth opportunities suggest otherwise, or more likely 
because firms mimic best board practices from other firms, resulting in less variation over time. 
A clear pattern exists in the representation of insiders on boards over time. The mean 
number of insiders increases from 5.19 in 1935 to approximately 6 throughout the 1950s and 
1960. Since 1960, the mean number of insiders has declined steadily, from 6.03 in 1960 to 1.77 in 
2000.  This decrease of 4.36 in the average number of insiders in the 1960-2000 period is actually 
larger than the decrease of 3.32 in average board size over the same period, indicating that the 
decrease in board size over this period is mainly due to a decrease in the number of insiders. 
Unlike board size, however, board composition does not display a converging pattern over time.  
The standard deviation of the number of insiders declines from 2.881 in 1935 to 1.123 in 2000, 
but the coefficient of variation increases from 0.556 in 1935 to 0.636 in 2000. Figures I, II and III 
plot the mean and standard deviation of board size, the number of insiders and percentage of 
insiders on the board.  
Although board size follows a hump pattern over the period of 1935 through 2000, we 
observe sharp and monotonic increases in the ratio of firm size to the number of directors over 
this period. Panel C of Table I reports summary statistics for sales per director, assets per director 
and market value of equity per director, all expressed in constant 2000 dollars. The median equity 
value per director increases rather steadily from $40 million in 1935 to $254 million in 1965, 
declines to less than $200 million during 1970-1980, and then increases steadily to $696 million 
in 2000. The mean value of this variable shows even more growth, increasing from $137 million 
in 1935 to $2.5 billion in 2000. Similar results hold for the mean and median values of sales per 
director and assets per director. We infer from these data that the responsibilities of directors, and 
the complexity of their work, have increased substantially over time. Figures IV and V show how 
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per-director sales and market capitalization have evolved during the sample period. Panel C also 
reports the degree of industrial and geographical diversification of the firm’s operations. The 
number of unrelated business segments increases from a mean of 1.297 in 1935 to 2.724 in 2000 
with the largest jump occurring between 1955 to 1960 (from 1.608 to 2.014) a period generally 
accepted as the beginning of the conglomerate merger wave. The change in the number of 
business segments remains at a substantially higher level thereafter and until 1985. After this we 
see the only two declines in this measure, from 1985-1990, and from 1990 to 1995, a period that 
coincides with the refocusing merger wave of the 1980s. The measure of geographical 
diversification shows an almost monotonic increase from a mean (median) of 6.3 (4) states in 
1935 to 18.2 (13) states in 2000. 
Table II reports data on the serial correlation of board size (Panel A) and insider 
representation (Panel B). Most of the correlations in Panel A are high and significant at the 1% 
level or better. In addition there are some interesting patterns. The correlation coefficients of 
board size in year 1935 with other years (column 2) decrease from 0.936 (year 1940) to 0.270 
(year 2000).  A similar pattern holds for other years. Also, the correlations of one period lags (for 
example, year 1935 with year 1940, year 1940 with year 1945, and so on) decreases over time (for 
example, from 0.936 for year 1935 with year 1940 to 0.615 for year 1995 with year 2000). This 
data are consistent with the conjecture that although there is some path dependence in board size, 
it has become less pronounced over time.  
Panel B of Table II reports the corresponding correlations for the number of inside directors. 
The data reveal a similar pattern as the one detected for board size – there is a decreasing trend in 
the serial correlations as the time period gets longer and the correlation between one-period 
lagged values declines over time. These results are consistent with the view that there is some   20
path dependence in board composition, although this also has become less pronounced over time. 
We examine the persistence of board size and composition in more detail in the regression 
analyses discussed in the next section. 
4.  FIRM SIZE, GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND BOARD STRUCTURE 
To test the hypotheses that board size and composition are determined by firm size and 
growth opportunities, we estimate a series of firm-fixed effects regression models on the panel 
data consisting of the 82 firms over the period from 1935 through 2000. Since we measure the 
values of the variables at five-year intervals, we have 14 observations per firm, except for four 
firms for which some data were not available.
12 We use a firm-fixed effects model to account for 
persistent firm-specific determinants of board structure (for example, whether the firm is family-
owned, ownership characteristics, and the like) which are not modeled in our analysis. 
The independent variables of interest are firm size and growth opportunities. In the reported 
regression results we use the market value of equity as the proxy for firm size (Mkt. Cap.).  
Regressions with sales and the book value of assets as the proxies for firm size yield similar 
results. Growth opportunities are measured by the ratio of the market to book value of assets 
(MTB Assets) and the ratio of property plant and equipment to total assets (PPE Ratio). These 
independent variables enter the equation in natural log form. Consistent with arguments presented 
by Hermalin & Weisbach (1988) we include the number of unrelated businesses that the firm is 
engaged in (# of business segments), as a control variable. Similarly, we include the geographical 
diversification of the firm’s operations (Geographical Spread) in both the board size and 
composition equations. The regression results are displayed in Table III. Panel A of Table III 
                                                 
12 We are unable to find ITT Industries (1940-60 and 1990), NL Industries (1945, 1955, 1985-1995), Inco Ltd. (1945, 
1955, 1975 and 1985-00) and Schlumberger Ltd. (1975 and 1985-00) for different years in our sample period. Missing 
years are indicated in the parentheses. For the missing firm-years we use Compustat data if available. The results are 
robust to the exclusion of these observations.   21
reports panel model estimates for board size. The coefficients on the market value of equity are 
positive and significant at the 0.05 level or better in each model, supporting the hypothesis that 
firm size is directly related to board size. This result is consistent with the results of Boone et al 
(2007), Coles et al (2007) and Linck et al (2007). This variable alone explains almost 60% of the 
variation in board size.
13  Column (1) shows that a strong nonlinear relation exists between market 
value of equity and board size, with board size attaining a maximum value when market value of 
equity is approximately $250 billion.  Although, the negative sign on firm size beyond a market 
capitalization of $250 billion is a bit puzzling, there are very few observations with market 
capitalizations above this level. Also this result conforms with the observation that firm size 
exhibits considerably more variation than board size
14 and is consistent with the general argument 
in the literature that beyond a relatively low number of board members, the coordination costs and 
free rider problems associated with additional board members are prohibitively large, regardless 
of firm size.  
Both proxies for growth opportunities enter with the anticipated signs and are significant at 
the 0.01 level or better.  When the market value of equity is specified linearly, the coefficients on 
MTB assets and the PPE ratio are -0.043 and 0.039, respectively, and both are significant at the 
0.05 level.  The absolute value of the coefficient on MTB assets is higher than the coefficient on 
the market value of equity, indicating that board size is more elastic with respect to this measure 
of growth opportunities than it is to firm size. Unlike the case for firm size, we had no a priori 
view that a nonlinear relation exists between board size and growth opportunities and none was 
found in a regression model (result not tabulated). The coefficients on MTB assets and PPE ratio 
do not change appreciably when the proxy for firm size enters the equation in nonlinear form. 
                                                 
13 R-squares for models without firm dummy variables range from 41% to 52%.   22
Taken together the results indicate a robust relation between growth opportunities and board size. 
When we account for the potential effects of secular trends on the relationship between board size 
and firm size and growth opportunities, by including time dummies for each five-year period in 
the sample. The overall results remain unchanged with only a slight increase in the adjusted r-
squared from 62% to 65% (Column 4). Finally, when we include the number of business 
segments, the coefficient is insignificant. However, geographical diversification has a positive and 
significant coefficient (at the 1% level).   
Panel B in Table III shows the regression results for models of insider representation (the 
percentage of board members who are inside directors). The coefficient on the market value of 
equity, when it is specified in linear form (Column (2)), is -0.051 and significant at the 0.01 level, 
consistent with the hypothesis that firm size is inversely related to insider representation on 
boards. The nonlinear specification (Column (1)) reveals that insider representation is actually 
increasing in firm size until the market value of equity reaches $40 million and then it declines 
(only 2% of the observations have market capitalizations of less than $40 million).  
The panel also reveals a highly significant relation between growth opportunities and insider 
representation, in the direction that we anticipate. The coefficient on MTB assets enters the model 
with a positive coefficient that is significant at the 0.01 level (Column 2 and 3). The coefficients 
are 0.073 (Column 2) and 0.064 (Column 3), on par with the coefficients on the proxy for firm 
size. The strong association between this proxy for growth opportunities and board composition 
supports the hypotheses developed in Section 2 and is consistent with the results of Boone et al 
(2007), Coles et al (2007) and Linck et al (2007).The coefficients on PPE ratio have the 
anticipated negative sign but are generally insignificant.  The number of business segments is 
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of 60,000.  Yet, board size ranges from 4 (Tootsie Roll) to 21 (Exxon Mobil), a multiple of only 5.     23
positively and significantly related with the percentage of insiders, but the coefficient of 
geographical spread measure is insignificant. 
As discussed earlier, both board size and board composition show a high degree of serial 
correlation, suggesting the possibility of path dependence in these board characteristics – an issue 
that has received little empirical attention in the literature due to lack of time-series data on 
boards. To examine this in more detail, we include lagged values of board size in the board size 
regressions and lagged values of insider representation in the insider representation regressions as 
independent variables. If board size and composition are path dependent, then significant and 
positive relations should exist between the contemporaneous and lagged values of these variables, 
after controlling for firm size and growth opportunities.  
Panel A of Table IV contains results from 13 separate regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the natural log of board size in 2000. In each regression we include the nonlinear 
specification of the market value of equity and the two proxies for growth opportunities, MTB 
assets and PPE ratio, as independent variables.
15 In each of the 13 regressions, a different lagged 
value of the board size variable is included as an independent variable. For example, in one 
regression 1995 board size is included as an independent variable, in another 1990 board size is 
included etc. The results reported in Panel A are consistent with the conjecture that there is some 
path dependence in board size. The coefficients on both the 1990 and 1995 lagged values of board 
size are approximately 0.39 and both are highly significant, indicating a fairly high elasticity of 
board size with respect to board size up to ten years earlier. Inclusion of the 1995 and 1990 board 
sizes increases the adjusted R-squared about 8% over the adjusted R-squared of the model that 
does not include lagged board size (results not reported), further indicating the high degree of 
                                                 
15 As mentioned earlier we do not include the geographical spread of firm operations and the number of unrelated 
business segments due to the significant differences in the way Moody’s reports this information across firms.   24
inter-temporal correlation in board size. The coefficient drops to 0.245 for 1985 board size, but it 
remains highly significant.    
Panel B of Table IV contains the corresponding results for insider representation on boards. 
The results show that inclusion of the 1995 lagged value of insider representation to the model 
compared with the model including no lagged values of insider representation increases the 
adjusted R-squared from 10.82% (result not reported) to 31.37%, indicating a high degree of 
serial correlation.  The coefficient on the 1995 value of insider representation is 0.502 and highly 
significant, indicating a high correlation of insider representation over the five year interval. The 
coefficient on the 1990 lagged value of insider representation drops substantially to 0.166, and is 
significant at the 0.05. None of the other lagged values of insider representation are significant, 
indicating substantially less serial correlation, and perhaps less path dependence, in insider 
representation than in board size. 
5.  ARE CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF BOARDS ASSOCIATED 
WITH M&A AND DIVESTITURE ACTIVITY? 
 
A major reason why a firm’s size and growth opportunities change over time is that the firm 
changes its asset mix through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and divestitures.  In this section we 
examine whether M&A and divestiture activity is associated with changes in the size and 
composition of boards. To measure M&A and divestiture activity of the firms in our sample over 
1935-2000, we consult Moody’s Industrial Manual, which reports the history of acquisitions and 
divestitures of each company listed in the manual. We read this history for each of the 82 firms in 
our sample to collect data on the number and transaction values of (i) mergers and acquisitions in 
which the firm acquired another firm, or a division, subsidiary or certain assets from another firm 
and (ii) divestitures involving spin-offs, carve outs, asset sales, or sales of subsidiaries and 
divisions. We then aggregate the number of these transactions for every five-year interval during   25
1935-2000 to match the board data. Because dollar values are reported for only about 25% of the 
transactions our analyses are based on the number of acquisitions/divestitures rather than the value 
of these transactions.   
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) show that industry shocks are 
a primary cause of merger and divestiture activity. In addition to causing such activity these 
industry shocks could also explain governance changes.
16 To examine this impact we calculate a 
measure of industry shocks following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996). For each year in our sample 
period we calculate the fraction of firms that are taken over in the same 2-digit SIC code industry as 
the sample firm. We then calculate the sum of this fraction in the preceding five years for each 
sample firm-year. We use this as an explanatory variable for examining the effect of industry 
shocks on board size and composition. 
Table V reports the yearly distribution of board structure and M&A transactions. The mean 
and median number of acquisitions, number of divestitures, and net number of acquisitions are 
reported for each five-year interval. The number of acquisitions and divestitures follows a pattern 
over time that is similar to the one displayed by board size. The mean (median) net number of 
acquisitions generally increases from 1935 to 1970 and generally declines thereafter. We do not find 
a similar pattern between insider representation on boards and the net number of acquisitions. 
Figures VI and VII plots board size and insider representation respectively (expressed in percentage 
form using 1935 as the base year), alongside the mean number of acquisitions, divestitures and net 
number of acquisitions over the sample period. 
To test whether a significant relation exists between changes in board structure and 
M&A/divestiture activity, we estimate a set of panel regressions in which changes in board size and 
insider representation are regressed on, among other independent variables, measures of   26
M&A/divestiture activity. The contemporaneous change in board size (insider representation) is 
calculated as the difference in board size (insider representation) at the end of year t minus the 
board size (insider representation) at the end of year t-5. M&A/divestiture activity and industry 
shocks are also similarly computed over the period from year t-5 to year t.  To examine the 
permanence of the changes that occur in board structure we also examine the subsequent change in 
board size (insider representation) computed as the change from year t to year t+5.
17   
Panel A of Table VI reports panel estimates of changes in board size. The independent 
variables of interest are the net number of acquisitions (Columns 1-4) and alternatively, the industry 
shock measure as an independent variable (Columns 5-8). Also included in the model are the 
change in the market value of equity, the change in the market-to-book ratio of assets, the change in 
the PPE ratio, and changes in the degree of industrial and geographical diversification, all computed  
from the previous period (year t-5) to the current period (year t).  
Column 1 shows a significant (at the 0.01 level) positive relation between the 
contemporaneous change in board size and the net number of acquisitions. This result is robust to 
inclusion of the variables in the multivariate model. More acquisitions relative to divestitures lead to 
increases in board size, consistent with the hypothesis and the evidence documented above that 
firms adapt their board size to their asset size. This result is also consistent with the findings of 
Boone et al (2007) who find that mergers tend to increase the board size of IPO firms. Also, the 
results show that increases in the geographical spread of firm operations are also significantly 
associated with increases in board size – the coefficient of 0.0529 on the change in geographical 
spread is significant at the 1% level. 
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Column 3 shows a significantly negative (p < 0.01) relation between the subsequent change 
in board size and M&A activity. This suggests that the increase in board size due to net acquisitions 
is not permanent and may be necessitated to fulfill a temporary increase in monitoring and advisory 
needs around mergers. The magnitude of the coefficient at 0.017 is substantially smaller than the 
corresponding coefficient obtained for the contemporaneous change in board size of 0.030 
suggesting that the reversal in board is not complete. The result for the extended model in Column 4 
is very similar to the result in Column 3. Also, the positive and insignificant coefficient on the 
geographical diversification measure shows that there isn’t a similar reversal associated with 
increases in board size due to greater geographical diversity in firms’ operations. 
Columns 5-8 report regression results of the effect of industry shocks on contemporaneous 
and subsequent changes in board size.  We find that similar to M&A activity at the firm level, 
subsequent to industry shocks there is a decrease in board size (Column 7 and 8). However, 
different from M&A activity measured at the firm level, the contemporaneous change in board size 
is also significantly negatively related to industry shocks in a univariate setting (Column 5). This 
result is not robust to the inclusion of the other variables in the extended model (Column 6). The 
decrease in board size due to industry shocks is consistent with Kole and Lehn’s (1999) finding that 
airline firms decrease their board size after deregulation. Kole and Lehn (1999) argue that this is in 
order to facilitate a quicker response to the market forces of a deregulated industry. Similar to the 
model’s that use M&A activity measured at the firm level, Column 6 shows that changes in 
geographical diversification are significantly associated with increases in contemporaneous board 
size and do not affect subsequent changes in board size. 
Panel B of Table VI reports the corresponding analyses for the change in the percentage of 
insiders. There is no significant association between the change in percentage of insiders and the net   28
number of acquisitions made by the firm. This is true of both the contemporaneous as well as 
subsequent change in the percentage of insiders. The lack of significance is similar to the finding of 
Boone et al (2007) of the insignificance of a merger variable (indicating a merger in the previous 
period) in predicting board independence. In a univariate setting industry shocks are significantly 
negatively related to both the contemporaneous and subsequent change in the percentage of insiders 
(Columns 5 and 8 respectively). However, these results are not robust to the addition of the changes 
in firm size and growth opportunities to the model.  
6.  REVISITING THE RELATION BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND THE 
SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF BOARDS 
 
  Previous literature has documented a relation between different measures of firm 
performance and the size and composition of boards (for example, Yermack, 1996, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1990). The experimental design in these studies treats the attributes of boards as being 
exogenously determined. Boone et al (2007), Coles et al (2007) and Linck et al (2007) treat board 
characteristics as endogenous variables. Further Coles et al (2007) specifically estimate the 
relationship between Tobin’s Q, board size and board composition simultaneously. Their estimation 
yields results that suggest that the relationship between firm performance and the structure of 
boards differs based on characteristics such as firm complexity.  
  To examine whether the relation between firm performance and board characteristics is 
affected when board characteristics are treated as endogenous variables we first report results for a 
fixed effects regression model in which firm performance is the dependent variable and board 
characteristics are treated as exogenous variables. We then report results from two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimates, in which board size and composition are treated as endogenous 
variables.   
A.   Treating board characteristics as exogenous   29
 
  Table VII reports results from fixed-effects models in which firm performance is regressed 
on, among other variables, the size and composition of boards. Two measures of firm 
performance are used: (i) the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets and (ii) 
operating margin (the ratio of operating income to sales).
18  Independent variables include a proxy 
for firm size (either firm market value or sales) and either board size or the percentage of insiders. 
When the market-to-book ratio serves as the dependent variable, we also include operating 
margin, the PPE ratio and subsequent sales growth (measured as the natural log of the ratio of 
realized sales five years hence to sales in the contemporaneous year) as independent variables.  
  Panel A of Table VII reports the results for the model in which the dependent variable is the 
market-to-book ratio.  When firm market value (sales) is used as the proxy for firm size, the 
coefficient on board size in is negative and significant (insignificant), consistent with Yermack 
(1996). Board composition enters with a positive and significant coefficient, indicating a direct 
association between the percent of insiders on the board and market-to-book ratios, when the 
proxy for firm size is firm market value.  When the proxy for firm size is sales, the coefficient on 
board composition is not significant. Panel B presents the corresponding results for models in 
which operating margin serves as the dependent variable. The coefficient on board size is negative 
and insignificant. The coefficient on board composition is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level. We next examine whether the results in Table VII change significantly when board size and 
composition are treated as endogenous variables.  
B. Treating board characteristics as endogenous 
 
  Table VIII presents results from a two stage least squares (“2SLS”) model in which the 
dependent variables are board characteristics and firm performance. In Panel A, we estimate in 
                                                 
18 Results using the return on assets are similar to those of operating margin.     30
turn, the determinants of board size and market-to-book ratio, and the determinants of board size 
and operating margin in two sets of simultaneous equations. Because the market-to-book ratio is 
playing the role of a performance measure in the second equation where it is the dependent 
variable, in the board size equation, where it was originally used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities, we replace it with an instrumental variable. Specifically we use the lagged market-
to-book ratio (i.e. the market-to-book ratio five years ago) as the proxy for the extent of growth 
options.
19  In the performance equations we include the subsequent sales growth as a proxy for the 
extent of growth options.  
  Panel A shows that the lagged market-to-book ratio and firm size enter the board size 
equation with significant coefficients that have the anticipated signs. The coefficient on the lagged 
market-to-book ratio of -0.071 is comparable to -0.061, obtained when the contemporaneous 
market-to-book ratio is used (Table III, Column 3) thereby suggesting that it is a suitable 
instrument. The estimated coefficient on board size in the market-to-book equation is positive and 
marginally significant. In the operating margin equation board size is insignificant. The absence 
of a negative relation between board size and firm performance is inconsistent with the view that 
smaller boards improve firm performance. Panel B shows the corresponding results for the 
percentage of insiders. Again, both the lagged market-to-book ratio and firm size enter the board 
composition equation with coefficients that are significant and have the anticipated signs. The 
coefficient on board composition is marginally positive (10% significance level) in the market-to-
book ratio equation and insignificant in the operating marginal equation. These results are 
inconsistent with the view that more outside directors cause increases in firm performance.  
7. DISCUSSION  AND  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
19 Similar results obtain when we use the market-to-book ratio instead of the lagged market-to-book ratio.   31
We find that two variables, firm size and growth opportunities, explain a large amount of the 
cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the size and composition of boards.  Board size 
increases in firm size and decreases in growth opportunities, whereas insider representation 
decreases in firm size and increases in growth opportunities.  Net acquisitions lead to board size 
increases that are partially reversed subsequently. Industry shocks lead to decreases in board size. 
The results suggest that an underlying logic, one consistent with value maximization, explains the 
variation in board size and composition. 
The evidence on the endogeneity of board size and composition has important implications 
for both the scholarly literature on boards and the public discourse on reform of corporate boards. 
First, many scholarly empirical papers treat board characteristics as exogenous and infer from 
their results that certain board sizes and compositions cause differences in firm value and other 
measures of firm performance (for example, Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998)).  In light of our results, and other studies that attempt to account for the endogeneity of 
board characteristics (Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (1999), Boone et al 
(2007), Coles et al (2007), Linck et al (2007)), we are skeptical that one can infer causality from 
studies that treat board characteristics as exogenous.  We find that after treating board size and 
composition as endogenous variables, no robust relation exists between firm performance and 
these board characteristics.   
Second, the results suggest that “one size fits all” approaches to reform of corporate boards 
are likely to impair the effectiveness of boards.  For example, advocates of small boards (for 
example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993)) appear to be underestimating the 
informational advantage of large boards for firms that are large, relatively easy to monitor, and 
less in need of nimble governance.  Similarly, those who advocate that boards consist of a   32
minimum number of outside directors (or a maximum number of inside directors) are 
underestimating the costs that such boards would have on firms with high growth opportunities, 
large information asymmetries, and a greater need for nimbleness.  For example, such constraints 
could impose high costs on firms such as Genentech, where scientific knowledge and quick 
decision-making are likely to be highly valued. 
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Appendix A 
List of sample firms 
Name of Company*  Name of Company* 
AMPCO PITTSBURGH CORP  KRESGE S S CO 
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO  KROGER COMPANY 
BOEING CO  MARATHON OIL CORP 
BRIGGS & STRATTON CORP  MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO  MAYTAG CORP 
BROWN SHOE INC NEW  MCGRAW HILL COS INC 
BRUNSWICK CORP  MELVILLE CORP (CVS) 
CATERPILLAR INC  MESTEK INC 
CHEVRONTEXACO CORP  NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP 
COCA COLA CO  NL INDUSTRIES 
COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO  OLIN CORP 
CONOCOPHILLIPS  PENNEY J C INC 
CROWN CORK & SEAL INC  PEPSICO INC 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP  PHARMACIA CORP 
DANA CORP  PHELPS DODGE CORP 
DEERE & CO  PHILIP MORRIS COS INC 
DU PONT E I DE NEMOURS & CO  PHILLIPS VAN HEUSEN CORP 
EASTMAN KODAK CO  PITTSTON COMPANY 
EATON CORP  PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 
EXXON MOBIL CORP  RADIOSHACK CORP 
F M C CORP  RAYTECH CORP DE 
FOOT LOCKER INC  RYERSON TULL INC NEW 
FORTUNE BRANDS INC  SCHLUMBERGER LTD. 
FOSTER WHEELER LTD  SEARS ROEBUCK & CO 
G A T X CORP  SPARTON CORP 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP  STANDARD COMMERICAL 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO  STARRETT L S CO 
GENERAL MILLS INC  SUNOCO INC (Sun Oil) 
GENERAL MOTORS CORP  TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 
GILLETTE CO  TIMKEN COMPANY 
GOODRICH CORP  TOOTSIE ROLL INDS INC 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBR CO  U S T INC 
HERCULES INC  UNISYS CORP 
HERSHEY FOODS CORP  UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC  UNIVERSAL CORPORATION 
I T T INDUSTRIES INC IND  UNOCAL CORP 
INCO LTD.  VULCAN MATERIALS CO 
INGERSOLL RAND CO LTD  W H X CORP 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS COR  WALGREEN CO 
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO  WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR CO 
KIMBERLY CLARK CORP  WYETH 
*The names provided are the most recent firm names.   34
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Table I 
Descriptive statistics of sample firms 
 
Panel A 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of sample firms at a five-year frequency between 1935 and 2000. It contains four panels.  Panel A reports the mean and 
median of sales, assets, market value of equity (MV Equity), the market-to-book ratio of assets and equity, and the ratio of property, plants and equipment to the 
book value of assets. Dollar amounts are in billions of constant dollars of 2000. 
  
Sales Assets  MV  Equity  MTB of Assets  MTB of equity  PPE/Assets  Year Freq. 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1935  81  1.017 0.215 1.828 0.423 2.160 0.476  1.766  1.304  2 1.352  0.422 0.389 
1940  80  1.449 0.493 2.036 0.592 1.953 0.471  1.381 1.08  1.522 1.096  0.383 0.367 
1945  78  2.895 1.108 2.200 0.723 2.407 0.787  1.697  1.402  2.115 1.643  0.265 0.205 
1950  80  2.754 0.994 2.125 0.713 2.378 0.664  1.398  1.203  1.567  1.28  0.338 0.319 
1955  78  3.955 1.379 2.932 1.111 5.709 1.273  1.891  1.671  2.411 1.995  0.339 0.328 
1960  79  5.205 1.998 4.310 1.802 7.050 2.194  2.062 1.47  2.682 1.759  0.379 0.332 
1965  80  6.619 2.935 5.459 2.517  11.465  4.011  2.299  1.653  2.966  2.02  0.351 0.315 
1970  80  7.885 4.062 7.187 3.194  10.114  2.812  1.759  1.355  2.256 1.618  0.381 0.365 
1975  78 11.009  4.998 7.868 3.873 7.928 2.282  1.525 1.16  2.195 1.279  0.378 0.335 
1980  80 12.884  6.014 9.213 4.230 7.139 2.365  1.337  1.134  1.891 1.298  0.376 0.369 
1985  77  13.896 6.669 11.723 4.158  8.966  3.732  1.478 1.335  2.022 1.607  0.392  0.393 
1990  76  15.221 6.440 16.281 4.324 10.683 3.757  1.543 1.246  1.883 1.478  0.346  0.334 
1995  77  16.225 6.881 19.363 5.368 16.116 5.237  1.94 1.524  2.985 2.557  0.345  0.32 
2000  79  19.068 8.402 23.980 7.423 32.073 6.871  2.237 1.509  4.53 2.705  0.316  0.282 
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Table I (Continued) 
Panel B 
 
Panel B reports the mean, median, standard deviation and coefficient of variation of board size and insider representation (both number of insiders and 
percentage of insiders) on the board of directors. 
 
Board Size  # of Insiders on the board  % of Insiders on the board  Year FREQ 
Mean Median Stdev  CV  Mean Median Stdev  CV  Mean Median Stdev  CV 
1935 82  12.43  11.00  5.545 0.45  5.19  5.00 2.881 0.56  0.44  0.43 0.201 0.45 
1940 81  12.81  11.50  5.346 0.42  5.48  5.00 2.658 0.49  0.45  0.44 0.186 0.41 
1945 79  12.63  11.00  5.007 0.40  6.06  5.50 3.285 0.54  0.50  0.49 0.215 0.43 
1950 81  13.19  12.00  5.097 0.39  6.30  6.00 3.255 0.52  0.49  0.51 0.191 0.39 
1955 79  13.88  13.00  5.439 0.39  6.18  6.00 2.940 0.48  0.47  0.44 0.197 0.42 
1960 81  14.48  15.00  5.109 0.35  6.03  6.00 2.918 0.48  0.43  0.40 0.184 0.43 
1965 82  14.25  14.00  4.566 0.32  5.79  5.00 2.736 0.47  0.42  0.39 0.169 0.40 
1970 82  14.35  14.00  4.106 0.29  5.65  5.00 2.815 0.50  0.40  0.39 0.179 0.44 
1975 80  13.96  13.00  4.281 0.31  5.24  4.50 2.413 0.46  0.38  0.33 0.168 0.44 
1980 82  14.00  14.00  3.805 0.27  4.65  5.00 2.231 0.48  0.33  0.33 0.137 0.41 
1985 79  13.92  13.50  3.653 0.26  4.21  3.00 2.451 0.58  0.30  0.27 0.141 0.47 
1990 78  12.96  13.00  3.045 0.23  3.27  3.00 1.714 0.52  0.26  0.25 0.140 0.54 
1995 79  11.68  12.00  2.494 0.21  2.31  2.00 0.936 0.40  0.21  0.18 0.097 0.47 
2000 80  11.16  11.00  2.682 0.24  1.77  1.00 1.123 0.64  0.16  0.13 0.099 0.61 
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Table I (Continued) 
Panel C 
 
Panel C lists the mean and median of sales per director, assets per director and market value of equity per director (MV Equity per director), in ‘000s of constant 
dollars of 2000. The number of unrelated business lines and geographical spread are obtained by reading the firm description in the Moody’s Manual for each of 
the sample years. The geographical spread usually measures the number states in which the firm has manufacturing facility locations. For firms such as those in 
the retailing business, it measures the number of different states with store locations. 
 
Sales per director  Assets per director  MV Equity per 
director 
Number of unrelated 
business lines 
Geographical spread  Year Freq 
Mean  Median  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median 
1935  82 137,357  39,534 73,777  20,154 130,181 39,586  1.297  1  6.302  4 
1940  81 120,193  43,400 97,186  45,922 135,472 49,445  1.378  1  7.219  4 
1945  79 156,973  68,008  200,952 89,188 152,291 62,462  1.466  1  7.328  4 
1950  81 144,105  58,093  174,085 79,851 138,614 65,697  1.554  1  8.500  5 
1955  79  324,639 111,760 235,379  117,656  181,168  87,248  1.608  1  9.359  5 
1960  81  405,982  153,255  305,350 139,122 253,870 122,273  2.014  2  10.281  6 
1965  82  661,366  253,743  392,578 186,680 327,258 168,323  2.227  2  11.292  8 
1970  82  603,597  182,159  476,890 296,994 448,967 228,735  2.480  2  12.569  9 
1975  80  472,779  157,678  674,188 385,630 476,498 260,080  2.587  2  15.000  11 
1980  82  444,197  177,398  798,934 483,881 575,440 355,092  2.880  3  15.924  11 
1985  79  528,374  274,558  810,409 495,456 685,193 319,505  3.123  3  16.063  12 
1990 78  703,428 278,408  1,004,628 490,233 1,042,074 365,442  2.781  3  15.509  11 
1995 79  1,271,224  423,514  1,310,331 625,115 1,530,117 394,192  2.649  3  16.108  12 
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Table II 




This panel provides Pearson correlation coefficients of board size from 1935 to 2000 at a five-year frequency.  All the coefficients are significant at 10% or 
higher. B1935 indicates board size in the year of 1935 and so on. 
 
  B1935 B1940 B1945 B1950 B1955 B1960 B1965 B1970 B1975 B1980 B1985 B1990 B1995 B2000 
B1935  1 . 0 0 0                
B1940  0.936  1.000              
B1945  0.899  0.931  1.000             
B1950  0.860  0.883  0.941  1.000            
B1955  0.720  0.762  0.798  0.859  1.000           
B1960  0.708  0.715  0.748  0.823  0.828  1.000          
B1965  0.640 0.641 0.705 0.760 0.719 0.903 1.000               
B1970  0.559 0.560 0.622 0.672 0.683 0.798 0.860 1.000             
B1975  0.587 0.594 0.609 0.642 0.572 0.721 0.777 0.731 1.000           
B1980  0.444 0.468 0.522 0.562 0.531 0.571 0.630 0.663 0.752 1.000         
B1985  0.438 0.419 0.469 0.496 0.485 0.601 0.628 0.607 0.716 0.824 1.000       
B1990  0.324 0.288 0.377 0.396 0.363 0.503 0.523 0.551 0.618 0.688 0.774 1.000     
B1995  0.217 0.187 0.266 0.279 0.220 0.418 0.478 0.542 0.489 0.489 0.550 0.633 1.000   
B2000  0.270 0.197 0.224 0.287 0.243 0.412 0.437 0.403 0.462 0.471 0.587 0.649 0.615 1.000 
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This panel provides Pearson correlation coefficients of board composition from 1935 to 2000 at a five-year frequency.  All the coefficients are significant at 10% 
or higher. C1935 indicates insider representation in the year of 1935 and so on. 
 
  C1935 C1940 C1945 C1950 C1955 C1960 C1965 C1970 C1975 C1980 C1985 C1990 C1995 C2000 
C1935  1 . 0 0 0                
C1940  0.702  1.000              
C1945  0.688  0.796  1.000             
C1950  0.646  0.761  0.811  1.000            
C1955  0.501  0.681  0.679  0.702  1.000           
C1960  0.392  0.455  0.547  0.627  0.643  1.000          
C1965  0.414 0.395 0.411 0.515 0.468 0.711 1.000               
C1970  0.582 0.466 0.527 0.509 0.462 0.586 0.684 1.000             
C1975  0.405 0.410 0.362 0.361 0.398 0.431 0.490 0.761 1.000           
C1980  0.261 0.333 0.237 0.331 0.292 0.248 0.440 0.495 0.600 1.000         
C1985  0.253 0.343 0.333 0.283 0.356 0.250 0.283 0.405 0.642 0.704 1.000       
C1990  0.185 0.230 0.215 0.153 0.272 0.177 0.277 0.400 0.499 0.592 0.643 1.000     
C1995  0.133 0.057 0.170 0.106 0.300 0.221 0.220 0.248 0.199 0.243 0.300 0.590 1.000   
C2000  0.094 0.051 0.164 0.063 0.130 0.159 0.151 0.123 0.119 0.136 0.075 0.258 0.538 1.000 
   42
Table III 
Panel model estimation for board size and insider representation 
 
This table reports results of panel data analyses of determinants of board size and insider representation. The dependent variables are the Log (Board Size) and % 
of insiders. The independent variables include log market capitalization (MktCap) (and its square), log market-to-book ratio of assets (MTB Ass), log PPE/Assets 
(PPE Ratio), the number of unrelated business segments in the firm’s operations, geographical diversification, and year dummies.  Robust T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
Dependent Variables   
PANEL A: Log (Board Size)  PANEL B: % of Insiders 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  1.469 2.299 1.337 0.751 0.689  0.375 0.991 0.543  0.251  -0.343 
  (8.58) (20.30) (7.90)  (3.53)  (2.12)  (3.04) (14.97) (4.56)  (1.79)  (-1.46) 
Log (Mkt Cap)  0.150*** 0.023*** 0.176*** 0.162*** 0.122***  0.047*** -0.051***  0.021  0.003  0.041 
  (5.60) (5.50) (6.71) (5.51) (2.73)  (2.54) (-18.17) (1.17)  (0.19)  (1.27) 
(Log Mkt Cap)^2  -0.005***  -0.006***  -0.002*  -0.002  -0.004***  -0.003***  0.000  -0.001 
  (-4.91)  (-5.80)  (-1.70)  (-0.10)  (-5.05)  (-4.14)  (0.12)  -(0.98) 
Log MTB Ass   -0.043***  -0.061***  -0.164***  -0.157***   0.073***  0.064***  0.003  0.001 
   (-2.30)  (-3.26)  (-7.79)  (-8.72)   (6.15)  (5.56)  (0.24)  (0.25) 
Log PPE Ratio   0.039***  0.039***  0.018  0.013   -0.014  -0.014  -0.019  -0.002*** 
   (2.33)  (2.26)  (1.31)  (0.95)   (-1.19)  (-1.27)  (-1.55)  (-2.13) 
     -0.002        0.010***  # of business 
segments       (-0.95)        (2.48) 
Geographical  Spread       0.003***        -0.001 
       (2.99)        -(1.32) 
Year  Dummies     Yes  yes      Yes  yes 
Adj  R-squared  59% 61% 62% 65% 71%  34% 36% 37%  52%  62% 
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Table IV  




This panel reports regression results of board size on lagged board size and log market capitalization (MktCap) (and its 
square), log market-to-book ratio of assets (MTB Ass) and log PPE/Assets (PPE Ratio). The dependent variable is Log (Board 
size 2000), the independent variables are the board sizes in years 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990, and 1995. Robust T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level;  
*Significant at 10% level. 
 















Lag board size in year 1935  1.168 0.054 0.001 -0.174***  0.055 0.074 43.36% 
  (1.64) (0.58) (0.47) (-3.43)  (1.44) (1.17)  
Lag board size in year 1940  1.118 0.064 0.001 -0.180***  0.058 0.049 43.80% 
  (1.55) (0.68) (0.42) (-3.51)  (1.50) (0.75)  
Lag board size in year 1945  1.629 -0.007  0.004 -0.174***  0.065*  0.072 41.00% 
  (1.93) (0.06) (0.97) (-3.41)  (1.68) (1.06)  
Lag board size in year 1950  1.081 0.062 0.001 -0.169***  0.056 0.075 44.30% 
  (1.52) (0.67) (0.41) (-3.21)  (1.49) (1.09)  
Lag board size in year 1955  1.203 0.055 0.002 -0.182***  0.056 0.038 43.35% 
  (1.69) (0.58) (0.51) (-3.44)  (1.44) (0.55)  
Lag board size in year 1960  1.192 0.043 0.002 -0.163***  0.055 0.093 44.56% 
  (1.72) (0.46) (0.57) (-3.04)  (1.47) (1.23)  
Lag board size in year 1965  1.198 0.038 0.002 -0.157***  0.059 0.114 44.92% 
  (1.75) (0.41) (0.61) (-2.89)  (1.59) (1.37)  
Lag board size in year 1970  1.257 0.033 0.002 -0.167***  0.056 0.092 44.29% 
  (1.83) (0.35) (0.69) (-3.11)  (1.49) (1.03)  
Lag board size in year 1975  1.129 0.047 0.002 -0.161***  0.059 0.113 44.54% 
  (1.62) (0.51) (0.52) (-2.95)  (1.55) (1.29)  
Lag board size in year 1980  1.065 0.057 0.001 -0.160***  0.052 0.105 44.32% 
  (1.49) (0.63) (0.40) (-2.83)  (1.40) (1.05)  
Lag board size in year 1985  0.765 0.060 0.001 -0.122**  0.043 0.245**  47.20% 
  (1.08) (0.66) (0.23) (-2.08)  (1.19) (2.01)  
Lag board size in year 1990  0.744 0.032 0.001 -0.114***  0.052 0.387***  51.28% 
  (1.10) (0.37) (0.39) (-2.17)  (1.44) (3.50)  
Lag board size in year 1995  1.136 -0.029  0.003 -0.128***  0.039 0.398***  51.47% 
  (1.76) (0.32) (1.17) (-2.64)  (1.13) (3.70)  
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This panel reports regression results of board composition on lagged board composition and log market capitalization 
(MktCap) (and its square), log market-to-book ratio of assets (MTB Ass) and log PPE/Assets (PPE Ratio). The dependent 
variable is % of insiders in 2000, the independent variables are the % of insiders in years 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 
1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. Robust T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** Significant at 1% level; ** 
Significant at 5% level;  
*Significant at 10% level. 
 















Lag % Insiders in 1935  1.075  -0.108***  0.003**  0.020  0.021  0.022  9.36% 
  (3.16)  (-2.36)  (2.01)  (0.82) (1.16) (0.38)   
Lag % Insiders in 1940  1.087  -0.113***  0.003**  0.018  0.019  0.066  10.48% 
  (3.18)  (-2.45)  (2.12)  (0.75) (1.01) (1.05)   
Lag % Insiders in 1945  1.642  -0.183***  0.006***  0.019  0.025  0.062  17.94% 
  (4.13)  (-3.49)  (3.16)  (0.80) (1.36) (1.18)   
Lag % Insiders in 1950  1.093  -0.108***  0.003**  0.020  0.020  0.002  9.02% 
  (3.16)  (-2.34)  (1.98)  (0.82) (1.09) (0.03)   
Lag % Insiders in 1955  1.056  -0.108***  0.003**  0.014  0.021  0.062  10.30% 
  (3.05)  (-2.31)  (1.99)  (0.56) (1.06) (1.00)   
Lag % Insiders in 1960  1.075  -0.112***  0.003**  0.014  0.016  0.089  11.55% 
  (3.16)  (-2.45)  (2.11)  (0.57) (0.87) (1.40)   
Lag % Insiders in 1965  1.072  -0.111***  0.003**  0.017  0.017  0.069  10.71% 
  (3.15)  (-2.44)  (2.10)  (0.70) (0.92) (1.03)   
Lag % Insiders in 1970  1.092  -0.112***  0.003**  0.018  0.017  0.044  9.89% 
  (3.20)  (-2.45)  (2.10)  (0.76) (0.85) (0.65)   
Lag % Insiders in 1975  1.090  -0.112***  0.003**  0.020  0.013  0.066  10.72% 
  (3.20)  (-2.45)  (2.08)  (0.82) (0.65) (0.93)   
Lag % Insiders in 1980  1.098  -0.114***  0.003***  0.020  0.018  0.085  10.73% 
  (3.24)  (-2.50)  (2.15)  (0.82) (1.00) (1.04)   
Lag % Insiders in 1985  1.117  -0.114***  0.003***  0.020  0.021  0.079  10.43% 
  (3.26)  (-2.48)  (2.12)  (0.84) (1.14) (0.99)   
Lag % Insiders in 1990  1.046  -0.111***  0.003***  0.013  0.018  0.166**  13.40% 
  (3.10)  (-2.45)  (2.16)  (0.52) (0.97) (2.03)   
Lag % Insiders in 1995  0.741  -0.083**  0.003*  -0.001  0.011  0.502***  31.37% 
  (2.44)  (-2.08)  (1.88)  (0.07) (0.70) (4.70)   
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Table V Yearly distribution of board structure and M&A transactions 
 
This graph reports the mean/median board size, % of insiders, number of net acquisitions which is defined as number of acquisitions minus number of 
divestitures, number of acquisitions, and number of divestitures in each five-year period from 1935 through 2000. 
 
























1935  81  12.43  0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 11  0.43 0  0  0 
1940  80  12.81  0.45 -0.05  0.46 0.51 11.5 0.44 0  0  0 
1945  78  12.63  0.50 0.32 0.49 0.17 11  0.49 0  0  0 
1950  80  13.19  0.49 0.33 0.65 0.32 12  0.51 0  0  0 
1955  78  13.88  0.47 0.86 1.04 0.18 13  0.44 0  0  0 
1960  79  14.48  0.43 1.62 1.95 0.33 15  0.40 1  1  0 
1965  80  14.25  0.42 2.05 2.47 0.42 14  0.39 1  1  0 
1970  80  14.35  0.40 4.41 4.87 0.47 14  0.39 3  3  0 
1975  78  13.96  0.38 2.78 3.70 0.92 13  0.33 1  2  0 
1980  80  13.95  0.33 1.10 2.62 1.52 14  0.33 0  2  1 
1985  77  13.91  0.30 0.77 3.45 2.69 13  0.27 0  3  1 
1990  76  12.96  0.26 1.28 4.89 3.62 13  0.25 1  3  2 
1995  77  11.68  0.21 1.73 4.55 2.82 12  0.18 1  4  1 
2000  79  11.16  0.16 3.25 6.05 2.80 11  0.13 2  5  1 
All  Years  1103  13.26  0.38 1.47 2.66 1.19 13  0.33 0  1  0 
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Table VI 
Panel model estimate for changes in board structure and M&A transactions 
 
Panel A 
Changes in board size 
 
This panel reports panel data analyses on changes in board size. The dependent variables are the change in board size from previous period to current period 
(Current Board size minus Lag of Board Size) and from current period to next period (Lead of Board Size minus Current Board Size). Independent variables 
include net numbers of acquisitions measured as number of acquisitions – number of divestitures; percentage of firms in the same 2-digit SIC code industry 
involved in mergers or acquisitions during each of the five-year intervals (Industry_M&As); change in firm size measured as change in market capitalization of 
the firm (log (Change in Mkt cap)); square of change in firm size ( (log (Change in Mkt Cap))^2 ); change in market-to-book ratio (log (Change in MTB Ass)); 
change in PPE ratio (log (Change in PPE ratio)); and year dummy variables. Results on year dummy variables are not. Robust T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
  log (BdSize/Lag of BdSize)  log (Lead of BdSize/BdSize)  log (BdSize/Lag of BdSize)  log (Lead of BdSize/BdSize) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  -0.018 -1.219  0.001 -0.3066 0.013 -1.0997 0.024 -0.1270 
  (-2.69)  (-1.63) (0.16) (-0.37) (1.69) (-1.26) (3.29) (-0.15) 
Net number of acqs  0.030***  0.0461**  -0.017**  -0.04790**      
  (3.37)  (2.11)  (-1.98)  (-1.97)      
Industry_M&As          -0.195*** 0.6717 -0.380***  -4.4568** 
        (-3.41)  (0.34)  (-5.34)  (-1.97) 
Change in number of business    -0.065  0.2131*   -0.047   0.1740* 
   (-0.65)   (1.84)  (-0.47)  (1.81) 
Change in geographical spread    0.0529***    0.0041    0.0513***    0.0052 
   (3.48)  (0.21)  (3.38)  (0.27) 
Log (Change in Mkt Cap)   0.0362  -0.1711  0.2445  -0.1747 
   (0.04)  (-0.18)  (0.31)  (-0.19) 
(Log (Change in Mkt Cap))^2   0.0384*   -0.0083    0.0349    -0.015 
   (1.82)  (-0.24)  (1.17)  (-0.34) 
Log (Change in MTB Ass)   -1.2245***   0.2131*   -1.3634***  0.9206*** 
   (-4.07)   (1.84)  (-4.67)  (2.85) 
Log (Change in PPE Ratio)   0.0144  0.0327  0.0231  0.0252 
   (0.10)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Adj R-squared  4.00% 13.71% 3.00% 10.34% 3.00% 13.25% 4.00% 10.20% 
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Table VI (Continued) 
 
Panel B  
Changes in percentage of insiders 
 
This panel reports panel data analyses on changes in percentage of insiders. The dependent variable is the change in % of insiders from previous period to current 
period (Chg in % of insiders (previous to current)) and from current period to next period (Change in % of insiders (current to next period)). Independent 
variables include net numbers of acquisitions measured as log (1+number of acquisitions) – log (1+number of divestitures); percentage of firms in the same 2-
digit SIC code industry involved in mergers or acquisitions during each of the five-year intervals (Industry_M&As); change in firm size measured as change in 
market capitalization of the firm (log (Change in Mkt cap)); square of change in firm size ( (log(Change in Mkt Cap))^2 ); change in market-to-book ratio (log 
(Change in MTB Ass); change in PPE ratio (log (Change in PPE ratio); the change in the number of unrelated business segments in the firm’s operations; the 
change in the geographical diversification; and year dummy variables. Results on year dummy variables are not reported. Robust T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 
  Change in % of insiders 
(previous to current period) 
Change in % of insiders 
(current to next period 
Change in % of insiders 
(previous to current period) 
Change in % of insiders 
(current to next period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  -0.021 -0.015 -0.020 -0.0218 -0.009 -0.0152 -0.013 -0.0320 
  (-4.23) (-0.37) (-4.07) (-0.52) (-1.40) (-0.37) (-2.08) (-0.75) 
Log (Net number of acqs)  -0.000  0.0004  -0.005  -0.0020      
  (-0.08)  (0.34)  (-0.98)  (-0.14)      
Industry_M&As          -0.140*** 0.0041 -0.122*** 0.1128 
          (-3.18) (0.34) (-2.59) (0.98) 
Change in number of business    -0.0026  -0.0010  -0.0026  -0.0013 
   (-0.47)  (-0.17)  (-0.47)  (-0.22) 
Change in geographical spread    0.0002    -0.0006    0.0020    -0.0005 
   (0.24)  (-0.63)  (0.24)  (-0.51) 
Log (Change in Mkt Cap)   0.0368  0.0562  0.0368  0.0607 
   (0.83)  (1.18)  (0.83)  (1.29) 
(Log (Change in Mkt Cap))^2   -0.0020  -0.0015  -0.0020  -0.0017 
   (-1.22)  (-0.86)  (-1.22)  (-1.00) 
Log (Change in MTB Ass)   0.0268  -0.0258  0.0268*  -0.0250 
    (1.83)*   (1.50)  (1.63)  (-1.51) 
Log (Change in PPE Ratio)   0.0061  0.0132*   0.0061   0.0136* 
   (0.78)  (1.76)  (0.78)  (1.72) 
Adj R-squared  2.00% 6.51% 2.00% 7.08% 1.00% 6.51% 2.00% 7.35%   48
 
Table VII 
Panel model estimates for board size/composition and firm performance 
 
This table reports panel data analyses of the association between board size/composition and firm performance. The dependent variables are log of market-to-
book ratio of assets (Log (MTB Ass)) and Operating Margin. Independent variables include firm size as measured by log of market value of the firm, Log (sales), 
Log (board size), % of insiders, operating margin, Log (PPE), and Sales growth (post). Sales growth (post) is measured as the natural log of the ratio of realized 
sales five years hence to sales in the contemporaneous year. Robust T-statistics are presented in parentheses.  ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% 
level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 




Intercept  -1.000  -1.701 -0.368 -0.368 0.122 -0.051 0.156  0.006 
  (-4.37)  (-8.95) (-1.54) (-1.66) (1.09)  (1.26)  (1.25)  (0.18) 
Log (MV of firm)   0.106***  0.119***    0.008***  0.013***    
  (10.11)  (10.04)     (2.86)  (4.15)    
Log (sales)     0.027**  0.028**    0.004**  0.009*** 
     (2.38)  (2.12)    (2.03)  (3.99) 
Log (board size)  -0.146**   0.011  -0.027  -0.022  
  (-2.15)   (0.15)  (-0.66)  (-0.55)  
% of insiders    0.438***   0.026   0.118***  0.101*** 
    (4.26)  (0.22)  (3.15)  (3.09) 
Operating Margin  0.899***  0.860***  1.032***  1.027***      
  (3.86)  (3.79)  (3.80)  (3.76)      
Log (PPE)  -0.128***  -0.123***  -0.104***  -0.103***  0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
  (-2.83)  (-2.94) (-2.67) (-2.67) (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.15) 
Sales growth (post)  0.187***  0.185***  0.154***  0.155***      
  (6.04)  (5.91)  (4.76)  (4.77)      
Adj  R-squared  (%) 59%  60% 44% 41% 15% 16% 15% 16% 
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Table VIII  
Board structure and firm performance in a system of equations 
 
This table reports regression results of two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation. The dependent variables are Log (board size), % of insiders, Log (MTB Ass) 
ratio and operating margin. . Independent variables include Log (board size), % of insiders, firm size as measured by Log (sales),  the lagged value of log(market-
to-book ratio), Log (PPE), and Sales growth (post). Sales growth (post) is measured as the natural log of the ratio of realized sales five years hence to sales in the 
contemporaneous year. Robust T-statistics are presented in parentheses.  ***Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. 
 








































    































































Adj R-squared (%)  38.82%  18.87%  38.82% 5.79% 29.30%  19.56%  29.30% 5.57% 
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